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Abstract 
Distributed knowledge based applications in 
open domain rely on common sense infor­
mation which is bound to be uncertain and 
incomplete. To draw the useful conclusions 
from ambiguous data, one must address un­
certainties and conflicts incurred in a holis­
tic view. No integrated frameworks are vi­
able without an in-depth analysis of con­
flicts incurred by uncertainties. In this pa­
per, we give such an analysis and based on 
the result, propose an integrated framework. 
Our framework extends definite argumenta­
tion theory to model uncertainty. It sup­
ports three views over conflicting and uncer­
tain knowledge. Thus, knowledge engineers 
can draw different conclusions depending on 
the application context (i.e. view). We also 
give an illustrative example on strategical de­
cision support to show the practical useful­
ness of our framework. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Expert systems rely on common sense knowledge 
which is conflicting and uncertain. Conflicts and un­
certainties are not orthogonal but intertwined. Uncer­
tainties usually lead to conflicts and conflicts usually 
result in uncertainties. Thus, any practical expert sys­
tems must address both aspects. 
Logic-based information reasoning is an interesting do­
main where conflicts, in the form of partial and oppos­
ing arguments, are unavoidable. With an eye on this 
particular domain, we propose a framework to capture 
the notion of conflict and resolve it under uncertain­
ties. 
The most widely used methodology for tackling con­
flicts and uncertainties are model-based approaches 
like classical logic. Owing to their declarative nature, 
they have difficulties in discerning different kinds of 
conflicts. On the other hand, argumentation, a reviv­
ing integrated approach, gives promising results ad­
dressing this issue. It studies not only models of knowl­
edge bases but also their structures, derivations and 
conflicts. Unifying these studies can lead to a deeper 
understanding of uncertain and conflicting knowledge 
bases. 
John Pollock pioneered the research of defeasible argu­
mentation (Pollock, 1990) but he only concentrated on 
probability analysis of the topic. P. M. Dung (Dung, 
1995b) and Robert Kowalski (Kowalski and Toni, 
1996) investigated how argumentation subsume other 
non-monotonic logics and logic programming frame­
works with minimalistic settings. Gerard Vreeswijk 
(Vreeswijk, 1997) employed argumentation to model 
multi-agent systems in a completely abstract way. 
Henry Prakken shed light on argumentation for prag­
matic legal applications with his extended logic pro­
gramming framework. Bart Verheij (Verheij, 1996) 
unified all contemporary argumentation within his two 
frameworks. Our framework differs from these re­
searches in that we concentrate on conflicts and un­
certainties in a distributed setting. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec­
tion 2, we describe our approach of modeling uncer­
tainties in argumentation and the conflicts that may 
pertain to such a setting. After introducing various 
definitions in Section 3, Section 4 and 5 outline the 
conflicts and possible resolution methods, respectively. 
We proceed to semantical analysis in Section 6 and 
dialectical analysis of proof-theory in Section 7. In 
Section 8, we describe how our framework relates to 
existing ones. In Section 9, a typical application of our 
framework is outlined. In the conclusion, Section 10, 
we discuss shortcomings of our framework and propose 
future work. 
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2 MODELING UNCERTAINTIES 
IN ARGUMENTATION 
2.1 Background 
Uncertainty takes many forms. In many application 
domains, quantitative measures of uncertainty are dif­
ficult to obtain (Fox et al., ; Paul Krause and Fox, 
1995), e.g. logic based information retrieval, rule based 
analysis, etc. In this paper, we focus on qualitative 
aspects of uncertainty. Undoubtedly, logic is one of 
the most powerful qualitative approaches. In classi­
cal model-based analysis of logic, entailment relation 
is declarative. Inference structure is not important as 
long as a fact can be derived. This is clearly undesir­
able for uncertainty reasoning. To draw useful conclu­
sions from a set of potentially conflicting and uncertain 
knowledge, we must know the structural aspect of in­
ferencing. We must know in what way conclusions are 
drawn and at which step conflicts are introduced. 
Argumentation is a variant of logic which can attack 
conflicts from their structures. Briefly, it was revived 
by Toulmin's book (Toulmin, 1958). Since then, many 
potential applications of the theory in nonmonotonic 
reasoning have been suggested (Lin, 1993; Lin and 
Shoham, ). The methodology of argumentation shows 
great similarity to the logic programming paradigm. 
As a result, various attempts (Dung, 1995a; Dung, 
1995b; Prakken and Sartor, 1997) have been made on 
blending the practical usefulness of logic programming 
and the philosophical insight of argumentation. 
In this paper, we show that argumentation is also 
applicable and, in fact, well-suited to the problem 
of uncertainty reasoning. Inspired by the work of 
Dung (Dung, 1995b) and Prakken (Prakken and Sar­
tor, 1997) , our framework is based on logic pro­
gramming. We represent knowledge with Extended 
Disjunctive Logic Program (EDLP)(Gelfond and Lif­
schitz, 1991) which is an extension of their frame­
work. We introduce disjunctive in the head of a clause 
for representing uncertain information. For example, 
{r1 : dog_bark -t stranger V arson} means "a dog 
barks if either it sees a stranger or an arson". 
2.2 Our Framework 
Our argumentation framework assumes a set of 
distributed knowledge based systems (KESs) (or 
agents). Conflicts are divided into two levels, namely 
1. Intra-KBS-conflicts - conflicts within one K B S 
2. Inter-KBS-conflicts - conflicts between K B Ss 
The network of KBSs are managed by parties with 
different interests, such as different departments in a 
university. Knowledge in the KBSs overlap with each 
other either entirely or partially. This overlapping will 
most likely contain deviant views to the same knowl­
edge. For example, in the government organization of 
a country, the industrial development council is usually 
pessimistic to possible outcome of raising interest-rate 
whereas the banking authority council usually bears 
an opposite view, viz: 
• Industry : raising-interest-rate may lead to 
pressure-on-indus try 
• Banking raising-interest-rate may lead 
to pressure-on-industry or stimulate-financial­
related-sectors 
To be general, one would like to keep multiple per­
spectives of the two views and apply them according 
to context. 
The problem of reasoning in a distributed setting is 
then not to change either KBSs as other parts of them 
rely on their own views. The objective is therefore to 
recognize differences between different views j opinions 
yet still enables knowledge engineers to draw useful 
conclusions out of them. The discrepancies between 
distributed KBSs may lead to non-logical contradic­
tion, and this is very difficult to model simply by clas­
sical logic. 
3 DEFINITION 
Formally, our argumentation framework is defined, in 
a top-down fashion, as follows: If a literall is an atom 
a then lis ...,a. If l is ...,a then lis a. An argumentation 
system AS is a binary-tuple < Ags, Pg > where Ags 
is a collection of distributed argumentation agents and 
Pg is a preference hierarchy between these agents. An 
argumentation agent Ag is a binary-tuple < R, P > 
where R is a set of rules and P is a preference hierarchy 
between these rules. A preference hierarchy P is a set 
of ordered pair in which we say "sis preferred than g" 
(denoted by s > g) if and only if < s, g >E P. A rule 
is an EDLP clause of the form, 
where r is the name of the rule, a1 , • • .  , an are all 
literals, ,...., is the non-provable sign1. We denote 
Cd(r) = {a1, ... , am}, Cn(r) = {am+l, . . .  , an}, 
1"' a means a is not derivable. 
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Strong(Cd(r)) = {all··· ,al} and Weak(Cd(r)) = 
{al+1, ... ,am}· An argument Arg is a finite sequence 
of rules {ro, ... , TN} in which every rule ri satisfies 
the following conditions. 
1. If p E Strong(Cd(ri)) then there exists r E 
{ro, ... , ri-d and p = certain(r). 
2. There exists q E Cn(ri) and denoted as 
certain(ri), such that if l E {Cn(ri) - q} then 
i-1 
[ E U certain{rj). 
j=O 
3 .. There does not exists r E {r0, ... , ri-d such 
that certain(ri) = certain(r) and certain(ri) 
certaih(r). 
The function certain denotes a "definite" reading of 
an "indefinite" clause. certain(r) denotes a literal in 
the conclusion of an indefinite rule such that all other 
literals are pruned by their complementary counter­
parts other rules' certain. For example, the value of 
certain(r2) is a in the following argument: {r1 :--+ 
•b, r2 :--+ a V b }. Condition 1 ensures that every rule 
in an argument must be grounded. Conditions 2 and 
3 ensure that a rule must have a unique meaning and 
rules in argument are not redundant, respectively. Re­
striction imposed by condition 2 is for the sake of sim­
plicity in demonstrating inter-KBS-conflicts. 
4 CONFLICTS WITHIN A KBS 
Under our framework, conflicts within a K BS is re­
ferred to as intra-KBS-conflicts. As an example, con­
sider the following segment of a legal knowledge base 
<R,P>. 
r4 : --+ finger _print 
r5 : finger _print --+ murderer V owner 
r7 : "' ownership--+ •owner 
r8 : "' criminaLrecord --+ •murderer 
r6 : murderer --+ puLinto_jail 
r9 : --+ criminaLrecord 
From the above, the following arguments are found: 
2. Arg2 entails Arg1 and r6. Irrespective of the out­
come of the proof of ownership (r7 ), Arg2 al­
ways leads to the conclusion that the murderer 
should be puLinto_jail. Thus, both murderer 
and puLinto_jail are certain() in Arg1. 
3. Arg3 is formed solely by r8• Thus, certain() of 
Arg3 (i.e. --,murderer) is inconsistent with that 
of Arg2 (i.e. murderer). This kind of head-on 
conflicts is called rebut. 
4. Arg4 entails r9 alone. Note that it attacks the 
assumption of Arg3• We call this undercut. 
From the above example, we define the following: 
Definition 1 Arg under-cuts Arl if and only if there 
exists a ruler in Arg, a ruler' in Arg' and a literal p 
in Weak(Cd(r')) such that p = certain(r). 
Definition 2 Arg rebut Arg' if and only if there ex­
ists a rule r' in Arg' and a rule r in Arg satisfying 
certain(r) = certain(r'), r' > r � P. 
Definition 3 Arg defeats Arg' if, 
1. Arg is empty and, Arg' undercuts itself; or 
2. Arg undercuts Arg'; or 
3. Arg rebuts Arg' and Arg' does not undercut Arg. 
Then, we define the asymmetric order strictly defeat 
as below. 
Definition 4 Arg strictly defeats Arg' if only if Arg 
defeats Arg' but not Arg' defeats Arg. 
5 CONFLICTS BETWEEN KESS 
In this section, we consider conflicts aroused in an ar­
gumentation system < Ags, Pg >. Conflicts pertain 
to a single KBS can also happen in a group of KBSs. 
To reflect that rebut is based on preference hierarchy, 
we add the following to the previous definition 2. 
Definition 5 Arg of Ag1 E Ags rebuts Arg' of Ag2 E 
Ags if and only if there exists a rule r1 in Arg and 
a rule r2 in Arg' such that certain(r1) = certain(r2) 
and Ag2 > Ag1 � Pg. 
Next, we shall consider conflicts pertaining to uncer­
tainties between different KBSs. When knowledge is 
distributed over a set of agents, it is not uncommon 
to see that the same piece of knowledge represented 
differently in different agents. For example, Table 1 
shows two agents, Agh and Agt2, which possess two 
variants of the same knowledge. It is intuitive to see 
that Agh will conclude puLinto_jail whereas Agt2 will 
not, owing to the uncertainty in r5. A direct merge of 
Agh and Agh will lead to puLinto_jail as Agh domi­
nates the union in the sense of classical logic. However, 
such conclusion essentially assumes certain informa­
tion with higher preference than uncertain information 
and is credulous in this regard. It is arguable that on 
what basis can we bear this assumption and cherish 
certain information rather than uncertain one? And 
on what basis we want to do it the other way round? 
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Table 1: Example of Two Distributed KBSs 
AGENT KNOWLEDGE 
Agt1 r1 :--+ finger _print 
r2 : finger _print --+ murderer 
r3 :""' murderer --+ release 
r6 : murderer --+ puLinto_jail 
Agt2 r4 :--+ finger _print 
r5 : finger _print --+ murderer V owner 
r6 : murderer--+ puLinto_jail 
5.1 Credulous View 
From the viewpoint of classical logic, we can interpret 
a rule r2 as a revision of another rule r5 if one shows 
that r5 is too loose a statement (see Table 1). This 
is exactly what embedded in the essence of classical 
logic. We called this a credulous view of distributed 
knowledge. 
In many traditional reasoning frameworks, without 
the non-provability sign ""'• credulous view can help 
to. enlarge the set of positive information. However, 
this is not the case for our framework and most other 
non-monotonic systems which attack default reason­
ing. This can be shown by the following example which 
consists of two agents Agtt and Agt2 (see Table 1). 
If we adopt the approach of classical logic, Agtt will 
clearly out-rate Agt2. Further, r3 is not applicable and 
hence, release is not deduced (which is deducible un­
der skeptical view, defined in the next section). Thus, 
credulous view is not necessarily additive in the pres­
ence of a skeptical view. 
5.2 Skeptical View 
Whe:ri our multi-agent framework is applied to the le­
gal reasoning domain, credulous inference is highly un­
desirable due to the spirit of " proof beyond any reason­
able doubts". Consider the last example, if ownership 
is also a plausible explanation for the evidence of one's 
finger print on an object, then how can we arrive at 
the conclusion of murderer with certainty? In fact, it 
is the job of the defense legal agent, in practice, to re­
trieve as many uncertain information as possible from 
legal knowledge bases and use them to presents "rea­
sonable doubts". Under such circumstances, we would 
prefer Agt2 's view to Agh. Such preference is actually 
a form of suppression and reveals conflicts between dif­
ferent KESs. Notice that this type of conflict aroused 
because of the great similarity between two variants 
of the same piece of information being distributed. In 
syntactic form, we introduce 
Definition 6 A rule r1 of Agt1 thins a rule r2 of Agt2 
if and only if Cd(r2) = Cd(r1) and Cn(r2) C Cn(rt). 
The semantic of thinning is self-explanatory. r1 is a 
more general statement about the relation between 
Cd(r2) and Cn(r2). It says that Cn(r1) - Cn(r2) are 
also possible outcomes of Cd(r2). In a modal sense, 
the necessity implied r1 is incorrect. Semantically , r2 
in Agt2 weakens the certainty of r1 in Agh. We call 
this type of uncertain conflicts thinning. It happens 
due to a skeptical view in the distributed knowledge 
environment. In general, we refer this as inter-KBS­
conflicts. 
Inter-KBS-conflicts pertain to any inference schema 
which supports qualitative uncertainties like disjunc­
tive in a distributed knowledge setting. A straight 
forward resolution scheme to inter-KBS-conflicts is to 
eliminate the additional uncertainties introduced, i.e. 
Cn(rt) - Cn(r2). 
For intra-KBS-conflicts, rules related to the judgment 
is easily defined. It is, however, not the same for inter­
KBS-conflicts. As inter-KBS-conflicts aroused because 
of the additional uncertainties in a rule, we consider a 
set of auxiliary rules to determine the defeating status 
1. If a rule r1 thins a rule r2 , the set of auxiliary 
rules is auxiliary(r1,r2) = {Cd(r1) --+ qlq E 
(Cn(rt)- Cn(r2))} and every rule is an alias of 
r1 in preference hierarchy. 
2. An argument Arg is not defeated by a rule r1 if 
r1 thins a rule r2 in Arg and for every auxiliary 
ruler in auxiliary(r1, r2), there exists an justified 
argument defeating it. 
To illustrate the idea here, let us consider the exam­
ple in Table 1 again. There is an argument Arg1 = 
{ rt, r2, r6} in Agh. By definition, r5 and r2 of Arg1 
show inter-KBS-conflict. The set of auxiliary rules is 
defined as, 
auxiliary(r5, r2) 
= {finger_print --+ qlq E (owner)} 
{finger _print --+ owner} 
To maintain Arg1 's undefeated status, additional ar­
guments must be found to defeat auxiliary rules in 
auxiliary(r5, r2). However, there is no such a rule in 
Agh UAgt2. 
Similar to credulous view, skeptical view also does not 
give us more certain information in reasoning. Con­
sideration of the simple example in the last subsection 
helps to illustrate this behavior. If we consider r5 as 
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a thinning attacker, puLinto_jail cannot be derived 
from Agh. Thus, a skeptical view does not, in gen­
eral, enlarge the set of facts concluded. 
5.3 Generalized Skeptical View 
In a skeptical view, we only focus on a particular 
type of similarity between disjunctive clauses. In this 
section, we extend the analysis to general similarity 
between two similar but yet distributed disjunctive 
clauses. In Table 2, we show the generalization of 
conflicting clauses of this kind. In the table , we as­
sume that both RA, RB and Rc, Rv are from different 
KBSs. Cond denotes the conjunctive condition where 
as r, A and Cone denote the disjunctive literal se­
quents. Also, RA and Rc are parts of arguments ArgA 
and Argc, respectively. 
Table 2: Conflicts Analysis Between Similar Clauses 
TYPE SCENARIO 
Subsumption RA : Cond ::::} Cone 
RB: Cond::::} Cone V A 
Intersection Rc : Cond::::} Cone V r 
Rv: Cond::::} Cone V A 
Two rules RA and RB are similar if and only if 
1. Conditions of RA and RB are the same; and 
2. Conclusion of RA intersects with that of RB. 
The notion of similarity is an extension of the skeptical 
view in which only subsumption is considered. In this 
extended setting, Rc and Rv are conflicting and Rv 
thins Argc. To determine the result, we consider the 
status of the rules involved, i.e. the unique meaning 
of Rc in Argc . 
In both situations, we show that a generalized skep­
tical view does not introduce new things and can be 
tackled by the following techniques: 
1. Case 1 : If eertain(Rc) E Cone, 
• There exists arguments defeating Cn(Rc) -
eertain(Rc ). 
• r <; {Cn(Rc)- eertain(Rc)}. 
• Thus, there exists arguments defeating r. 
• Rc degenerates to R'c : C ond ::::} Cone. 
• The problem is then reduced to subsumption 
problem in previous section 
- R'c: Cond::::} Cone 
- Rv: Cond::::} Cone V A 
2. Case 2 :  If eertain(Rc) E r, 
• There exists arguments defeating Cone. 
• The problem degenerates into 
- R'c : Cond::::} r 
- Rv: Cond::::} Cone V A 
• The conflict criteria are no longer met and 
thus can be neglect. 
The simplicity achieved in Case 2 is due to our unique 
meaning restriction imposed on the argument defini­
tion. The situation will be extremely complex when 
the restriction is relaxed. 
6 SEMANTICS 
Now we have the bells and whistles to define our argu­
mentation semantics for resolving conflicts under un­
certainties. Formally, our semantics is based on a fix­
point operator II which operates on two sets of ar­
guments ArgSet and S. IIs(ArgSet) gives a subset 
of S such that all their counter-argumentsfdefeaters 
are strictly defeated by arguments in Arg. It can be 
proved that II is monotone in credulous view, skeptical 
view and generalized skeptical view. The fix-point op­
erator II is essentially the same as Prakken's (Prakken 
and Sartor, 1997). Our semantics differ from his in the 
definition of "strictly defeat" which is the core con­
cept of argumentation. Indeed, there are three kinds 
of fix-point operator. The key point is in what way 
the notion of counter-argument is interpreted. Table 
3 summarizes the notion of counter-argument for dif­
ferent views shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
Table 3: Counter-Arguments For Different Views 
CREDULOUS 
COUNTER- self-defeat 
ARGUMENTS undercut 
rebut 
SKEPTICAL 
self-defeat 
undercut 
rebut 
*thinning 
To achieve monotonicity, the fix-point operator II re­
lies on the notions of asymmetric order ( "strictly de­
feat") which we introduced in the previous sections. 
By K naster- Tarski theorem, the fix-point II* of II with 
respect to a set of argument S exists and can be ob­
tained as below. 
F(O) = IIs(0) 
F(i) ITs(F(i - 1)) 
IIs limi-+oo F(i) 
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Let ArgSet be the set of all arguments which can be 
constructed from an argumentation system AS. An 
argument Arg is justified with respect to AS if and 
only if Arg E IIA.rgSet; it is defeated if and only if 
there exists a justified argument Arg' E AS strictly 
defeating it; and it is arguable, otherwise. 
7 DIALECTICAL PROOF THEORY 
Dung proposed a dialectical proof theory for argumen­
tation in (Dung, 1995b). Prakken adopted it in his 
fixed priority framework. As the proof-theory is de­
fined on arguments, we show that a simplified version 
of it can also be used in our framework. 
A proof of an argument is defined on an argument tree. 
Each internal/external node is an argument and their 
child nodes are their defeaters. An argument tree T is 
constructed as below. 
1. Level 1 is the proposition to be justified. 
2. At an odd (even) level, a proponent (opponent) 
makes moves to strictly defeat all (any) moves 
from opponents (proponents) at previous levels. 
3. In any branch, an opponent cannot make the same 
move twice. 
A proponent is said to win a branch of an argument 
tree if and only if the opponent cannot make any fur­
ther move at the branch; and said to win an argument 
tree if and only if it wins all branches. An argument 
Arg is provably justified if it wins an argument tree 
at level 1; it is provably defeated if it is defeated by 
a provably justified argument; and it is provably ar­
guable, otherwise. It can be shown that an argument 
Arg is provably justified with respect to an argumenta­
tion system AS if and only if it is justified with respect 
to AS 2. 
8 RELATION TO EXIS TING 
FRAMEWORKS 
It is easy to see that our approach collapses to 
Prakken's strict argumentation framework (Prakken 
and Sartor, 1997) when only one knowledge base 
is present or the set of knowledge bases is non­
disjunctive. Further, all arguments in rebuttal con­
flicts are arguable if priority is not available. In that 
situation, our framework reduces to partial semantics 
similar to Prakken's (Prakken and Sartor, 1997). 
2See appendix for details 
9 AN ILLUS TRATIVE EXAMPLE 
A company would like to perform strategically plan­
ning and seek an answer to the following question: 
Based on the current economic situations, is it prof­
itable to start a new production line? 
To proceed, the company consulted two strategic plan­
ning experts, experts A and B. It was hoped that in­
dividual analysis from two independent sources could 
help review the intricacies of the scenario. Table 4 
depicts knowledge set K B A and K B B extracted from 
expert A and B, respectively. The global order be­
tween experts is A > B. 
Table 4: Knowledge Bases of Expert A and Expert B 
EXP- KNOWLEDGE 
ERT 
A_l : � adversary_financiaLfactor 1\ 
economic_grow => demand_grow 
Az : stable_market 1\ demand_grow => 
new_production_line V increase_prod_A 
A3 : => stable_market 
A4 : •raw_materiaLA_enough => 
•increase_prod_A 
As : •raw_material_A_enough => 
•stable_market 
A6 : => economic_grow 
A1 : => •raw_material_A_enough 
Preference Hierarchy = { A3 > As} 
B1 : � adversary_financiaLfactor 1\ 
economic_grow => demand_grow V 
competition_grow 
Bz : competition-grow=> •stable_market 
B3 : � •stable_market 1\ 
� adversary_financiaLfactor => 
new_production_line 
B4 : � demand_increase => •demand_grow 
Bs : interest_raise => 
adversary_financiaLfactor 
B6 : => interest_raise 
B1·: => stock_index_raise 
Bs : stack_index_raise => 
•adver sary _financial_f actor 
Bg : => economic_grow 
Preference Hierarchy= {Bs > B5} 
In KBA, {A6, A1, As, A7, A4, A2} form an argu­
ment Arg1 . The unique meaning of Arg1 is 
new_productiordine which suggests a new production 
line for the business. { A7, A5} form another argument 
Arg2. Arg2 concludes that the market is stable which 
is contrary to the rule A3 in Arg1 . By definition, Arg2 
rebut Arg1 . According to K B A's preference hierar­
chy, Arg1 wins. Thus, Arg1 is justified with respect to 
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KBA. 
In KBB, {Bg,B1,B4,B2} form an argument Arg3, 
{B3} form Arg4, {B6,B5} form Arg5, {B7,B8} form 
Arg6. Arg3 is undercut by Arg5 which is then rebuted 
by Arg6. Arg3 undercuts Arg4. According to the pref­
erence hierarchy, Arg6 strictly defeats Arg5 and Arg3 
is then justified. Arg4 is strictly defeated by the jus­
tified argument Arg3. 
Consider the notion of skeptical view, we notice that 
A1 of KBA and B1 of KBB are similar knowledge 
about the relation among "adversary financial factor" 
, "economic grow" and "demand grow". By definition, 
B1 thins Arg1, the argument with A1. The auxiliary 
rule is then, 
Ai : ,...., adversary_financiaLfactor 1\ economic_grow 
=> competition_grow 
To defeat B1 and restore Arg1 's justified status, we 
have to find arguments rebutting Ai. However, there 
is no such arguments. Thus, we have two different 
conclusions from KBA and KBB. Credulous view 
suggests a new production line whereas skeptical view 
does not suggest any strategic moves. The result is 
close to our intuitive understanding of credulous rea­
soning and skeptical reasoning. 
10 CONCLUS ION 
In this paper, we have discussed the inherent assump­
tion in classical logic 3 and how it affects distributed 
reasoning under uncertainties. We have proposed an 
integrated framework for handling both intra-KBS� 
conflicts and inter-KBS-conflicts holistically. Further­
more, we have also discussed the general aspects of 
inter-KBS-conflicts for uncertainty reasoning. 
As it is, our argumentation model is a little bit re­
strictive. It only works well in near horn (Reed et al., 
) knowledge systems. Relaxing that restriction will 
lead us either to Stable semantics ( Gelfond and Lifs­
chitz, ) or Well-founded semantics (Ross, 1989). Such 
an extension not only bridges our framework to other 
frameworks in non-monotonic reasoning but also fa­
cilitates the modeling of more complex problems. In 
either way, it would be interesting to see how inter­
KBS-conflicts are modeled and resolved. These lay 
down the core of our future work. 
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A APPENDIX 
Before going into the soundness and completeness proof, we shall 
introduce the following notations to simplify the proof procedure. 
For an argument Arg, 
• tree(Arg) is the argument tree in which Arg wins; 
• branch(T) is the set of branches of an argument tree T; 
• length(B) is the length of a branch; 
• move(B, n) is the nth move of a branch B; 
• player(M) is the player that responsible for the move M. 
The proofs shown here are in Lamport style (Lamport, 1993). 
Monotone Proof 
Lemma 1 Given a set of argument S and conflict free subset S; 
and Si+1 � S;. If an argument Arg is in ITs(S;) then Arg is also 
in IIs(S;+l). 
PROOF SKETCH: We prove the thesis by contradiction. We assume 
there is an argument Arg in II(S;) but not in II(S;+1). Using the 
definition of fix-point iteration, a contradiction is shown. 
AssUME: 1. 3 argument Arg, s.t. Arg E II(S;) and Arg {<! IT(Si+l) 
(1)1. 3DArg defeating Arg which is not defeated by arguments in 
si+l· 
(1)2. S; � Si+l implies DArg is also not defeated by S;. 
(1)3. 3DArg defeating Arg which is not defeated by arguments in 
S;. 
(1)4. By definition, Arg E II(S;) implies f=IDArg defeating Arg 
which is not defeated by arguments in S;. 
D 
Theorem 1 The fix-point operator II is monotone. 
PROOF: A direct rephrasing of lemma 1. 
Soundness Proof 
Lemma 2 If arguments Arg is provably justified, then there exists 
an argument tree such that every move of the proponent in every 
branch involves only justified arguments. 
PROOF SKETCH: We prove the lemma by induction on the level of 
tree(Arg). Let h be the height of tree(Arg). We argue that all 
proponent moves at level h are justified. By backward induction, 
we argue that proponent moves at odd level i must also be justified 
based on justified proponent moves at level i + 2. 
AssuME: 1. 3 tree(Arg) s.t. Arg wins all branches. 
2. n = length(tree(Arg)) 
3. level(Arg, i) = {mlm E move( branch( tree(Arg) ), i) 
} 
(1)1. Basis : at level h = n, 'Vm E level(Arg, h), m is justified 
(2)1. player(m) =proponent 
(2)2. m is the last move implies f-liii defeating m 
(2)3. m is justified by definition 
(2)4. Q.E.D. 
(1)2. Induction Step : If i is odd and level(Arg, i+ 2) is justified, 
then level(Arg, i) is also justified 
AssUME: 1. level(Arg, i + 2) is justified. 
2. leaf = {mlm E level(Arg, i) and m is not the last 
move of the branch } 
3. non-leaf= level(Arg, i) - leaf 
(2)1. leaf is justified, by the same reason in (1)1. 
(2)2. 'Vm E non-leaf, 3 m  E level(Arg, i + 1) strictly defeat it. 
(2)3. since m E non-leaf and end move of every branch is by 
proponent, there exists a move m * by proponent after iii. 
(2)4. m* is justified as m* in level(Arg, i + 2). 
(2)5. 'Viii of m, iii is strictly defeated. 
(2)6. m is justified by fix-point definition. 
(2)7. Q.E.D. 
(1)3. Completion : For all odd integer i < n, level(Arg,i) is 
justified. Moves of proponent only occur at odd level of an 
argument tree. 
D 
Theorem 2 All provably justified arguments are justified. 
PROOF SKETCH: Every provably justified argument, Arg, has an ar­
gument tree in which all proponent moves are justified. Arg is one 
of those proponent moves and the result follows. 
(1)1. By lemma 2, 3t E tree(Arg) s.t. all proponent moves oft are 
justified. 
(1)2. Root oft is justified. 
(1)3. Arg is root oft. 
(1)4. Arg is justified. 
D 
Completeness Proof 
Lemma 3 If Arg is a justified argument, then there exists an ar­
gument tree such that every moves of the proponent involves only 
justified arguments. 
PROOF SKETCH: We start to construct a tree inductively with a jus­
tified argument Arg. At every odd level i, we show that there exists 
justified arguments DArg strictly defeating the defeaters of level i. 
DArg can then form level i + 2's move. Then, we can inductively 
construct an argument tree by non repetitive moves of the opponent. 
AssUME: 1. Arg is justified. 
2. T is an argument tree. 
3. Arg is at level 1 of T. 
(1)1. Basis : Level 3 is justified. 
AssUME: 1. D is the set of defeaters defeating level (A rg, 1). 
(2)1. 'Vd E D, 3 d  E fix-point strictly defeating d. 
(2)2. DArg ={did E D} is justified by definition. 
(2)3. let level(Arg, 3) = DArg 
(2)4. Q.E.D. 
(1)2. Induction Step : If level i is justified, there exists justified 
level(Arg, i + 2) defeating level(Arg, i + 1) 
AssuME: 1. level(Arg, i) is justified. 
2. level(Arg, i + 1) is non-empty. 
3. arguable = {mlm E level(Arg, i) nm is defeated by 
level(Arg, i + 1) } 
(2)1. level(Arg, i + 1) defeats level(Arg, i) 
(2)2. 'Vm E arguable, there exists iii in fix-point defeating 
level(Arg, i + 1) 
(2)3. level(Arg, i + 2) = {mlm E arguable } 
(2)4. level(Arg, i + 2 is justified and defeats level(Arg, i + 1) 
(2)5. Q.E.D. 
(1)3. Completion : Thus, there exists a proof tree in which every 
proponent level involves only justified arguments. 
D 
Theorem 3 All justified arguments are provable. 
PROOF SKETCH: We prove the thesis by contradiction. Start with 
there exists a justified argument Arg that is not provable. Using 
lemma 3 we find an argument tree to support Arg and lead to a 
contradiction. 
ASSUME: 1. Arg is justified. 
2. By Lemma 3 and the hypothesis, 3 T, an argument tree 
such that 
a. every move of a proponent is justified 
b. a proponent cannot move in a branch B 
(1)1. Let 
1. m = move(B,length(B)) 
2. iii= move(B,length(B)-1) 
(1)2. iii is justified. 
(1)3. 3 m' , s.t. m' strictly defeats m. 
(1)4. m' is a viable move for the proponent. 
D 
